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Practice Reflections
Practice Reflections 
Practice reflections is a section for opinion pieces. These articles are 
reflections on recent events or current topics in social work, welfare,  
or community work education and practice. 
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If it is easy to be critical of ideas that are going out of favour; it is 
especially sensible to interrogate practices which currently seem positive 
and progressive. That is, in so far as a practice has the status ‘this is a 
given’, even more ‘wow, this is a good one’, it follows that this practice is 
entitled to critique. This applies whether such practices form a discipline, 
such as social work or psychology; an approach, such as strengths-
based or solutions applications; or a rubric, such as family therapy or 
case management. Critical reflection (CR) may be more a rubric, or a 
developing tradition, than it is an application or discipline, but as this 
body of practice is being enthusiastically explored and developed, so it 
should be questioned and reviewed.
For example, rather than allowing CR to be understood as a stand-alone 
innovation, in her plenary session to the recent AASWWE conference 
(September 2009) Jan Fook noted that CR should be seen to stand on 
the shoulders of particular philosophical traditions, not least of which is the 
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Socratic dialogue. In this openness to self scrutiny, key figures in CR are 
alive to the importance of acknowledging the range of questions that CR 
raises. ‘What is our genealogy?’ is one of these important questions and 
‘what are the key critical questions for CR?’ is another. 
In this spirit, this brief paper attempts to introduce queries which might 
be usefully examined in an open and non-defensive exploration. This 
seems timely, given that CR presents within and beyond social work as an 
upbeat and increasingly popular phenomenon. Against this background, 
and albeit in a preliminary manner, the following brief paper outlines 
three classes of query. Each of these will be discussed in turn: 
(i) Are the linkages between critical reflection and its conceptual 
neighbours sufficiently articulated? 
(ii) The issue of power: who owns the game and writes the rules  
with respect to CR? and
(iii) Is it masculinist to think of CR as ‘transformative’?
In presenting this material it is important to note that what follows  
is a summary of some preliminary thoughts, responses that were initially 
stimulated by attending the conference mentioned above. Energized 
by this participation, a number of queries arose and were then further 
developed. Hopefully, the articulation of these ideas might be of interest 
to other social work practitioners and teachers with a lively interest  
in CR.
The aim of this short piece is not directly academic. Rather, the paper 
represents an attempt at discussion rather than analysis or evaluation. I’d 
like to encourage discussion and to outline lines of enquiry – suggestive 
avenues that might prove to be the basis for scholarly investigation. 
Crucially, the current paper uses only one basic reference: Fook and 
Gardiner (2007). Therefore, the ideas raised might be a long way from 
being applicable to, and representative of, the large and rapidly expanding 
literature on CR that is now available.1  Given the idea is to raise 
preliminary ideas, and not to offer anything in the way of conclusions, 
what follows can be seen as ‘serious play.’ 
119
(i) LiNKAGES BETwEEN CritiCal refleCtion AND iTS 
NEiGhBOURS ARE NOT ALwAyS wELL ARTiCULATED.
Although not the focus of substantial examination in the text used  
as the reference point for the current review (Fook & Gardiner, 2007),  
there is a great deal in common between the theory and practice of  
CR and adjacent post-modern practice traditions. For example, initially 
prompted by Tom Anderson’s work on the use of reflective teams in 
family therapy, Harlene Anderson (no relation) developed a range of 
practical ideas that seek to free-up supervisees and trainees who have 
become ‘stuck.’ This project clearly has obvious parallels with the goals 
and process of CR. (Interestingly, in common with writings on CR, 
Harlene Anderson also references Donald Schon’s theories on  
the importance of professional reflection) 
Of particular note, a clear protocol for group based discussions in 
training and supervision was set out over five stages (Anderson and 
Rambo, 1988; Anderson and Swim, 1993): the becalmed or ‘stuck’ 
presenter nominates what they seek from the process; the presenter 
outlines the crucial information; questions of clarification from the 
team are discussed; there is a reflective team exploration; the presenter 
summarizes what s/he has experienced and learned. Importantly, 
in Anderson’s iteration what is distinctive is that the reflective team 
exploration stage can only be witnessed by the presenter who is not 
permitted an active role in the discussion at this point. This is proposed 
so the presenter is barred from contributing to this stage of the exchange 
process in order to pre-empt the kind of defensive dynamic that is often 
generated in such consultations. In so far as Anderson and Swim’s version 
of the process has advantages, this innovation offers the iteration of  
CR I read about, and directly experienced, an additional option.
1. At short notice Jan Fook and Fiona Gardiner generously read a close-to final draft of this paper. 
Each was happy that the current paper sought to critically discuss ideas evoked by the theory and 
practice of critical reflection. Of particular note, Jan was clear the current paper represented a 
very limited engagement with CR for two reasons: (i) it is referenced to only one text ( Fook and  
Gardiner, 2007) which means no generalizations to other CR iterations are warranted, and (ii) 
given this qualification, the present text should be seen as a kind of partial discussion document 
rather than as an analysis or evaluation. I thank Jan and Fiona for their feedback and have 
embedded this content into the final manuscript.
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Similarly, the usual sequence in CR seems to resemble those ideas 
concerned with supervision, consultation and training associated with 
narrative practice. These developments can be dated to the late 1980s, 
e.g. a special edition of the Dulwich Centre Newsletter (summer 
1989/1990) took the lead in discussing, and then putting into action, 
a rush of innovative ideas around reflective processes. For example, 
in narrative practice a number of consultative processes have been 
formulated, usually but not necessarily, constituted in based-team 
participation (see for example, White 1999; 2007). These formats 
seek to be conceptually and ideologically coherent as they also seek 
to be practically useful in opening space for the ‘stuck’ practitioner 
(‘witnessing circles’ are the most popular of these formats). In working-
up these processes narrative practitioners have devoted significant effort 
to, and have evolved a considerable expertise with, structuring these 
consultations so that group processes are conducive to the imagining of 
new possibilities whilst also remaining sensitive to complex, and often 
problematic, themes around accountability and blame. (see for example, 
White, 1999).2 
Another example of an absence of cross-citation can be seen in the 
manner positive outliers – ‘exceptions’ – are considered in and beyond 
CR. That is, in narrative there is a keen interest in ‘unique outcomes’; 
in solution-based work there is a focus on ‘when is the problem not the 
problem’; in strengths-based practice there is an interest in ‘exceptions’ 
– as there is in CR. Despite these apparent parallels, there seems little 
cross-referencing between these traditions in any direction: between  
CR and narrative, between narrative and strengths, and so forth. 
A further example of conceptual relationships being under-articulated 
is that popular representations of CR do not seem to link themselves to 
the available literature on systems consultation. This is regrettable, as 
these linkages seem particularly relevant yet seem to be left more or less 
undeclared. Although the development of this point is beyond the scope 
of the present work to begin to outline in even a preliminary  
2. Christine Fagan and I discussed our responses to the CR workshop in October. Christine,  
a narrative enthusiast, was good enough to read the first draft of this paper.
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form, suffice it to say there is a substantial literature that is available  
on systems consultation within and beyond family therapy as there is  
also a set of linkages with the emerging interest in (so- called) ‘complex 
cases’, complex systems and complexity theory. 
In this instance, and presumably more generally, it seems likely 
the growth of CR might be stimulated by a close, and explicitly 
acknowledging, dialogue with its adjacent, and often very lively, 
colleagues. For example, Amies and Weir (2001) put forward a 
process for reflective group supervision. This formulation explicitly 
acknowledges, and then practically integrates, Jan Fook’s substantive 
development of ideas from the reflective tradition; equally, Amies and 
Weir clearly acknowledge what they have taken from the narrative 
tradition. Likewise, Pizzi (2001) offers another contribution, one that 
is specifically tailored to a consideration of social work supervision, 
that publically affirms its conceptual embeddedness. Such collaborative 
conversations have the advantage of being mutually informing.
(ii) ThE iSSUE Of POwER: whO OwNS ThE GAmE AND wRiTES  
ThE RULES?
A key distinction in the theory and practice of CR is between ‘learning’ 
and ‘therapy’: the aim of the CR process is always said to be the former, 
not the latter. Whilst those in the movement, such as Jan Fook in her 
plenary comments, are alive to the fact that this is to construct a binary, 
there remains a potentially troubling issue that may be common to the 
two espousedly distinct projects of CR and therapy.
Foucault (1973), Pentony (1981), Furlong and Lipp (1995), along 
with many others, have long argued that traditional accounts of the 
therapeutic project make the power relationship between the therapist 
and the client invisible. This glossed-over story renders the therapist as 
benign, neutral, possessing a privilege that is assumed to be pro-social, 
and so forth. Despite its demotion in critical texts, this naïve account  
still holds sway in many circles.
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Similarly, it is possible to hold a vision of the action of CR that is 
grounded in a parallel understanding. This eliding version does not attend 
to the matter of power – to the crucial question of ‘who writes the rules 
and who owns the game?’ when it comes to CR. This root question can 
then be resolved into its component elements: who is the proper authority 
when it comes to defining adequate, sufficient, genuine, etc., qualities in 
the participant’s process of, or outcome from, critical reflection?; who is it 
that judges reflection, especially if the consultant (if that is the right term) 
has a sponsor, that is, has been brought in by management and/or has a 
clear position in the agency’s hierarchical structure?
There was an earlier version of CR: ‘consciousness raising.’ In structural 
social work texts, and in other emancipatory projects (such as those 
dedicated to second and third wave feminist and also Marxist political 
programs) there was, and there still is, an ambitious and high-toned 
purpose, as well as a troubling imperial tone, in the articulation of the 
process that is referred to as ‘consciousness raising.’ In this process the 
right-thinking expert, it is assumed, is able to discern instances of false 
consciousness from correct consciousness and to lead the less knowing  
to the form of knowing that is correct. 
A powerful case can be made for the possibility that ‘correct thinking’ 
can, at least in some instances, be distinguished from ‘incorrect 
thinking’ mindful that this distinction has to remain an actively 
interrogated possibility. This noted, it appears that the usual discourse 
of critical reflection tends to beg the question of power that the issue of 
‘consciousness raising’ introduces. At least in my limited experience of 
CR it is here that it is necessary to ask: is it the participant, the group or 
the leader (the more knowing expert) who determines how successful the 
outcome of the CR process is?; is there an ongoing dialogue about the 
criteria that should be used to judge the success of CR?; is the question 
‘who knows best?’ up for dispute?. 
In so far as these kinds of questions are not regularly debated there 
is a potentially troubling resonance between the traditional account 
of therapeutic neutrality and CR. In so far as this is so, there might 
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also be a conflict between the modernist project of ‘raising the client’s 
consciousness’ and that of ‘undertaking a process of critical reflection.’
(iii) iS ThE iDEA ThAT CR iS ‘TRANSfORmATivE’  
A mASCULiNiST CONCEiT?
CR has been described by its enthusiasts as ‘transformative’ and as 
associated with ‘breakthroughs.’ That CR may, at certain times and 
within specific conditions, be experienced as a powerful change agent is 
not open to question. This acknowledged, CR is no silver bullet and it is 
important to underline this limit because it is tempting to ‘over-egg the 
pudding’ in the pragmatic, even craven, organizational and professional 
environments within which most of us currently work. This context 
invites grand claims to be read into the outcomes of the process of CR. 
Given that the organizational and cultural environment CR is positioned 
within favours determinate action and masculinist claims to utility, it 
follows there has to be a tug towards coupling with this ethos. 
To hold against this temptation, to not allow itself to be ramped-up like 
the salespersons for products like cognitive-behavioural therapy are happy 
to do, CR needs to be clear about its project and its nature. Yes, CR can 
be understood as a form of strategic consultation within complex systems 
but it can also be understood as something more aesthetic, as a kind 
of Trojan horse – an action that might be productively smuggled into 
highly stressed settings and used as a prompt for group-based processes 
of mutual support and affirmation. That enhanced relationalities 
– supportive relationships and a firmed-up sense of collectivity – might 
be occasioned by the introduction of CR processes is an important, 
arguably the central, attribute associated with CR. This should not be 
under-valued as many of us are hungry for experiences of solidarity. Even 
as our employers – that set of human service, health, community and 
educational organizations we have to dance with – increasingly demand 
masculinist outcomes ‘delivered’ by muscular actors, it is a healthy 
counter-moment to be prompted to stand together. 
That CR is not reducible to a masculinist technique contradicts the 
possibility CR might be mis-read as a psychologising trick, as a quick 
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and effective way of bumping individuals into assessing alternative 
subjectivities, even identities, so as to be empowered to identify (faux) 
personal solutions to structural issues. A 30 minute intervention, however 
well designed, is never likely to be an adequate response to problems of 
resourcing, work place design or the bullying culture that is sometimes 
present in organisations. To be allowed to be presented as a device that 
offers the dream of a transformative ‘ah-ha!’ experience would be to 
challenge the values of struggle and solidarity that are inherent to CR  
or, more precisely, to one more political reading of what is central to CR. 
Of course, there are always multiple readings of what is at stake.  
For example, the conclusion reached by Fook and Askeland’s (2005) 
in their report on the effectiveness of CR emphasised that workers 
became, across a number of overlapping dimensions, more professionally 
autonomous. This sounds positive, yet this conclusion might also be 
read as problematic: might a preferred outcome that allows a capacity for 
power to be individualised discount the weight of empirical materiality 
and the importance of solidarity? Such a preference could be seen as an 
elision that is inconsistent with what some would contend is the crucial 
dimension to CR: the structural dimension. 
There must be contesting positions with respect to what is inherent 
to CR. One version advocates an outcome where individual workers 
are able to perform a greater capacity for sense, self-determination and 
professional power as the preferred stand-alone effect. Another view 
contends that such an effect is not necessarily positive and that ‘good’  
CR is essentially associated with the promotion of relationalities and 
group solidarity, as well as with more aesthetic outcomes including  
an enhanced capacity for personal accountability and mindfulness.
CONCLUSiON
The contest around the proper nature of CR is a lively concern and flows 
into more finite questions: Is CR about a ‘stuck-point’ to be negotiated,  
a critical incident to be un-picked or is it best used as a de-briefing process 
that is to take place after lesser experiences of trauma? Is it about an issue 
to be worked through, or a process that acts as a pep-talk to gee the 
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worker into more imaginative and empowered personal action? Perhaps, 
it is best understood as a practice that is about group functioning rather 
than it is about individuals: that staff groups, for example, might be 
aided to be better primed to hold against the depredations of anxiety or 
disorganization, self-blaming or me-firstism. These and other questions 
arise as soon as we step back and temper an enthusiasm for CR with a 
critical spirit. How deep do you go in the process of CR: does one have 
to proceed from situation to assumptions, and then into personal values? 
At the level of radical review a further nest of questions also arise: is 
the process of CR worthwhile if it does not lead to a sense of enhanced 
agency?; might participation in the process of CR be less about individual 
‘empowerment’ than it is associated with a greater understanding 
of accountability and/or a deeper capacity for contemplation and 
compassion. As explored by Fook and Askeland (2005) these are some  
of the questions practitioners and authors identified with CR are  
happy to consider.
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